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It is the fate of democracy that not all means are suitable in its eyes, and not all 
of the methods employed by it are open to it. Democracy quite often fights with 
one hand tied behind its back.1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On Wednesday, January 7, 2015, two masked men armed with automatic 
weapons broke into the offices of the French satirical magazine Charlie 
Hebdo in Paris. They shot and killed twelve people, and injured another 
ten.2 Later on, Al Qaida took responsibility for the attack.3 In the weeks 
that followed, three more terror attacks were perpetrated on European 
soil.4 Since the beginning of 2015, a number of other terror attacks have 
taken place in various countries around the world.5  Unfortunately, terror 
attacks have become a routine part of life, and this new truth triggers the 
importance of discussing the legal status of terrorist organizations and 
persons who act on their behalf. 
These terror attacks illustrate two central changes that terrorism has created 
in the nature of international warfare. First, the war against terror is an 
asymmetrical war, as opposed to the traditional notion of war between one 
sovereign nation and another. Terrorists are not combatants belonging to 
the military forces of a state. Through such status, they challenge the rules 
of international humanitarian law. Second, these terrorists are not the 
freedom fighters of the colonial age, seeking to oust an occupying force 
and gain their own independence. Instead, these terrorists seek to harm 
 
 1.  HCJ 5100/94 Pub. Comm. Against Torture v. Israel 53(4) PD 817, ¶ 39 (1999) (Isr.). 
 2.  12 Dead in Terror Attack at the Offices of the Satirical Weekly in Paris that 
Published Caricatures of ISIS and the Prophet Mohamed, HAARETZ (Jan. 7, 2015) (Isr.) 
http://www.haaretz.co.il/news/world/europe/1.2532956. 
 3.  The Two Brothers Who Perpetrated the Attack on Charlie Hebdo Received 
Combat Training in Yemen, HAARETZ (Jan. 11, 2015) (Isr.), http://www.haaretz.co.il/news 
/world/europe/1.2533970. 
 4.  Report: 4 Hostages Killed in A Terror Attack in A Paris Supermarket; The 
Terrorist Was Killed, MAKO (Jan. 9, 2015) (Isr.), http://www.mako.co.il/news-world/ 
international-q1_2015/Article-8443952199eca41004.htm; Denmark: One Killed and Three 
Wounded in a Shooting Attack, GALATZ (Feb. 14, 2015) (Isr.), http://glz.co.il/1064-58331-
he/Galatz.aspx; Terror in Denmark: Jewish Man Killed Outside a Synagogue, MAKO (Feb. 
15, 2015) (Isr.), http://www.mako.co.il/news-world/international-q1_2015/Article-
ac108e05a3a8b41004.htm. 
 5.  See Kenya attack: 147 dead in Garissa University assault, BBC (Apr. 3, 2015), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32169080; David D. Kirkpatrick, Tunisia Museum 
Attack Is Blow to Nation’s Democratic Shift, N.Y TIMES (Mar. 18, 2015), http://www. 
nytimes.com/2015/03/19/world/africa/gunmen-attack-tunis-bardo-national-museum.html 
?_r=0; Salman Masood, Rebels Tied to Blackout Across Most of Pakistan, N.Y TIMES (Jan. 
25, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/26/world/asia/widespread-blackout-in-pakistan-
deals-another-blow-to-government.html?_r=1. 
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democratic regimes and generate a new world order that suits their ideology 
and beliefs. 
Despite recent changes that have occurred with respect to terrorist  
organizations, international law has not yet adapted to the new reality. The 
laws of war, which regulate the rules that apply to combatant forces at 
times of armed conflict, were drafted in an era in which wars usually took 
place between two sovereign nations. Nowadays, in many cases, wars take 
place between a state and non-state organization, including terrorist 
organizations. For example, consider the United States campaign in 
Afghanistan, as well as the ongoing war between the State of Israel and 
terrorist organizations in Judea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip.6 
Terrorists do not distinguish between military forces and civilians, which 
ultimately calls into question the most basic of distinctions in international 
law. Because the laws of war do not provide a response for situations where 
an army of a democratic country faces a terrorist organization, military 
forces are required to act in ways that do not necessarily comply with 
international law. For example, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) employed 
the use Palestinian civilians as human shields, an action known as “Neighbor 
Procedure.”7 As will be discussed below, another example is what is 
known as a “targeted killing” policy. Thus, it is clear that international 
law has failed to adjust to the current situation, and the failure to provide 
states with tools to deal with the threat of terrorism has led and will 
continue to lead to civilian harm on both sides of the fence. It is important 
to note that international laws of war are based on the presumption that 
each of the parties to a conflict takes care of its own civilians.8 In the case 
of a dispute between a terrorist organization and a state, this presumption 
is invalid. In those disputes, it is often clear that the terrorist organization 
intentionally puts its own citizens at risk, acting from within population 
concentrations and concealing its weaponry there. 
This article will examine the current status of the international law of war 
with respect to terrorist organizations and their operatives. The central 
 
 6.  Emanuel Gross, The Struggle of a Democracy against the Terror of Suicide 
Bombers: Ideological and Legal Aspects, 22 WIS. INT’L L.J. 597, passim (2004) [hereinafter 
Gross, Democratic Struggle Against Terrorism]. 
 7.  See generally HCJ 3799/02 Adalah v. Head of Central Command (3) PD 67 (2005) 
(Isr.) (considering the practice by IDF of using Palestinian civilians as human shields—an 
action known as “Neighbor Procedure” —as being illegal and contradicting international law). 
 8.  Pnina S. Baruch, Legal Dilemmas in Asymmetrical Combat Confrontations, 4 
MIL. & STRATEGIC AFF. 39 (2012) (Isr.). 
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argument of this article is that international humanitarian law is unable to 
cope with the reality of international terrorism. The basic definitions of 
“combatant” and “civilian” are not suitable within the context of the age of 
terrorism.9 In the past, combatants were presumed to be either a member of 
a state, or in the alternative, freedom fighters expressing an idea of resistance 
against a colonial occupation. Terrorist organizations and their members are 
not freedom fighters, but rather, are members of extreme organizations that 
aim to force a new order on the countries of the world.10  Therefore, because 
terrorists are neither combatants nor civilians, the international law of war 
must recognize a third category of “illegal combatants,” which will equip 
states with appropriate tools for fighting terrorism. 
Part II of this article will discuss the definition of  “terrorism” in international 
law. First, I will set out the various—failed—attempts made by authors of 
international law to reach an agreed definition of the term “terrorism.” 
Second, I will discuss the definition of “terrorism” as it exists under the 
national laws of several countries, and will analyze ways in which those 
definitions can help shape a universally agreeable definition. Finally, this 
section will discuss the Rome Statute, which set up the International 
Criminal Court (“ICC”), and why the “crime of terrorism” was not included 
within the ICC’s jurisdiction. 
Part III will discuss, in detail, the fundamental principle of international 
law – the principle of war—specifically, the distinction between combatants 
and civilians. I will examine how this principle relates to international 
humanitarian law, which recognizes only two categories, civilians and 
combatants. Further, I will discuss the significance of this categorization 
with respect to terrorist organizations and the ability of states to harm 
terrorists. The second part of this section will set out the principle of 
proportionality, which provides that the military benefit must be balanced 
against the damage that might be caused to the civilian population, and 
the difficulty in applying the principle of proportionality in the context of 
the war against terror. 
Part IV will discuss the issue of the status of terrorists in international 
law. Because their position is not regulated explicitly, this section will 
examine whether it is possible to include them under one or other of the 
currently existing categories, combatants or civilians. To this end, this 
section will set out each of the categories (or sub-categories), the protections 
 
 9.  The unsuitability of international law in dealing with terrorist organizations is 
noted in the John Doe case: “[W]e cannot ignore the fact that the provisions of international 
law that exist today have not been adapted to changing realities and to the phenomenon of 
terrorism that is changing the face and characteristics of armed conflicts and those who 
participate in them.” CrimA 6659/06 John Doe v. State of Israel (4) PD 359, ¶ 9 (2008) (Isr.). 
 10.  Gross, Democratic Struggle Against Terrorism, supra note 6, at 75. 
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that they afford, and the conditions that must be met in order for them to 
apply. Next, this section will examine whether terrorists meet the necessary 
conditions with respect to each category, and whether it would even be 
appropriate to grant them the defenses they would be entitled to if they 
did qualify under those categories. 
Part V will focus on the Supreme Court ruling in Israel in the targeted 
killing case, as a test case that demonstrates the deficiencies of international 
law with respect to a democratic country’s fight against terror organizations. 
I will analyze the Court’s holding itself, as well as set out its failure which 
both embody and emphasize the incompatibility of the rules of international 
humanitarian law to the war on international terrorism. 
Finally, Part VI will focus on a proposed third category—illegal combatants. 
First, because this category has not yet been recognized in international 
law, this section will discuss both its definition and overall significance. 
Second, this section will analyze the Red Cross’ position with respect to 
recognizing illegal combatants as a third category and the development of 
humanitarian law so as to adapt to modern warfare against terrorism. 
Finally, this section will set out countries that have recognized this 
category in their legal systems, and will analyze the way in which the 
category has been defined. 
II. TERRORISM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
A. The Definition of Terrorism in International Law 
The terror attacks that have occurred around the globe since the start of 
2015 illustrate, yet again, the fact that terrorism is a broad and worldwide 
phenomenon. In light of this increase in terrorism, it is not surprising that 
a variety of definitions for the term “terrorism” in international law have 
been proposed over the years. These varying definitions of terrorism reflect 
the unique characteristics of the term, which distinguish it from ordinary 
criminal acts. 
The first attempt to define the phenomenon of terrorism was in 1937, 
when the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism was 
drafted. This Convention was drafted under the auspices of the League of 
Nations, but at the end of the day, did not come into force.11 Almost 50 years 
 
 11.  HILLI M. EVEN CHEN, TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: 
THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN COMBATANTS AND CIVILIANS IN THE MODERN FIELD OF COMBAT, 
32 (Inst. for Legis. Res. & Comp.L., Hebrew U. of Jerusalem, 2010) (Isr.). 
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later, a resolution was passed by the Security Council of the United Nations 
in 1994 regarding measures for overcoming international terrorism, in which 
it was resolved that: 
Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, 
a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any circumstance 
unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, 
racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that may be invoked to justify them.12 
This definition suggests that the motive for perpetrating acts of terrorism 
is ideological, and that the effect of such acts is that they cause a sense of 
panic and concern among the population at large, or a particular group of 
persons. In addition to this resolution, a number of international treaties were 
executed13 with the purpose of regulating the methods by which terrorist 
activity could be combatted. However, these treaties lack any operative force, 
since at present, there is still no consensus in the international community 
regarding the substance of the acts of terrorism that the treaties are intended 
to deal with.14 
For decades, authors of international law avoided using or defining the term 
“terrorism.”  Instead, they preferred to define the possibilities of suing and 
extraditing persons who perpetrated acts of violence against aircraft, airports, 
diplomats, etc.15 The International Terrorism Conference16 attempted, 
between 1972-1979, to adopt an agreed definition of terrorism, but this was 
unsuccessful, mainly due to the insistence of the G-7717 that “national 
liberation movements” were not to be included in the definition of terrorism. 
Later conferences which took place in the 1990s were also unsuccessful in 
reaching an agreed definition of the term “terrorism.”18 Even in the wake of 
 
 12.  G.A Res. 49/60, (I) ¶ 3 (Dec. 9, 1994). 
 13.  See generally, U.N. Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing, 
(Dec. 15, 1997); G.A. Res. 54/109 (Dec. 9, 1999) [hereinafter U.N. Convention for the 
Suppression of Financing of Terrorism]. 
 14.  Gross, Democratic Struggle against Terrorism, supra note 6, at 35. 
 15.  Gilbert Guillaume, Terrorism and International Law, 53 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 
537, 538 (2004) (UK). 
 16.  G.A. Res. 51/210, ¶ 9 (Dec. 17, 1996) (establishing an Ad Hoc Committee to 
develop and elaborate conventions suppressing terrorism, and to “address means of further 
developing a comprehensive legal framework of conventions dealing with international 
terrorism”). 
 17.  G-77 is a group of seventy-seven developing countries which was set up in 
1964, and which includes many Islamic countries. About the Group of 77, THE GROUP OF 
77, http://www.g77.org (last visited Feb. 2, 2016); see also G.A Res. 42/159 ¶ 1 (Dec. 7, 
1987) (stating that one of the purposes of holding an international conference was to define 
the term “terrorism” and distinguish it from the struggle of peoples for national liberation). 
 18.  Guillaume, supra note 15, at 539. 
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the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the U.S., the U.N. Security 
Council was unable to come up with a clear definition of the term.19 
Despite the lack of an agreed-upon definition in international law, 
many independent countries have enacted their own laws defining the 
term. The common definition in many countries is the “use or the threat 
of use of violence against a person or property (including essential  
services) perpetrated with the intent of terrifying the population or with 
the intent of forcing a person, government or organization to do or not 
to do any action; or out of political, religious or ideological motives.”20 
A similar definition may be found in Israeli law,21 American law,22  
 
 19.  Id. at 539–40. 
 20.  Mordechai Kremnitzer, Terror and Democracy: the Case of Israel, 14 HAMISHPAT 
9, 10 (2010) (Isr.). 
 21.  Prohibition of Financing of Terrorism Law, 5765-2005, SH No. 1973 § 1 (Isr.). 
defines an “act of terrorism” as: 
(a) An act that constitutes an offense or a threat of committing an act that constitutes 
an offense done or planned to be done in order to influence a political, ideological or 
religious matter, in which all of the following exist: (1) It is done or is planned 
to be done with the aim of arousing fear or panic among the public or with the 
aim of forcing the government or some other governmental authority, including 
the government or governmental authority of a foreign state, to do an act or not 
to do an act (. . .); (2) the act done or planned to be done constitutes—(a) real 
harm to the body or liberty of a person, or placing a person at risk of death or 
serious injury; (b) creation of a real danger to the health or security of the public; 
(c) serious harm to property; (d) serious disruption of infrastructure, systems or 
essential services.  
Note that the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance, 5708-1948, contains a very broad definition 
of the term “terrorist organization” (section 1): “A group of persons that in its activities 
employs acts of violence that might cause the death or injury of a person, or threats of such 
violent actions.” 
 22.  International terrorism, under 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (2009) is defined as:  
(1) the term ‘international terrorism’ means activities that – (A) involve violent acts 
or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the 
United States or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed 
within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any State; (B) appear to be 
intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the 
policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct 
of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and (C) occur 
primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or transcend 
national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the 
persons they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which their 
perpetrators operate or seek asylum . . . .  
The definition of domestic terrorism was modified by the Uniting and Strengthening 
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism 
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British law,23 and Canadian law.24 
These countries’ definitions share a common desire to prevent harm to 
individuals and to protect persons and property from hostile activity, the 
nature of which is to spread fear and panic.  Another common theme 
amongst the definitions is the suggestion that the reason for perpetration 
 
(USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 802, 115 Stat. 272 (amending 
18 U.S.C. § 2331 (2001)):  
(5) the term ‘domestic terrorism’ means activities that - (A) involve acts dangerous 
to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of 
any State; (B) appear to be intended - (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; 
(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) 
to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or 
kidnapping; and (C) occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United 
States. 
 23.  Terrorism Act 2000, c. 11, § 1 (UK):  
(1) . . . ‘terrorism’ means the use or threat of action where- (a) the action falls 
within subsection (2), (b) the use or threat is designed to influence the government 
or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, and (c) the use or threat is 
made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause. (2) 
Action falls within this subsection if it- (a) involves serious violence against a 
person, (b) involves serious damage to property, (c) endangers a person’s life, 
other than that of the person committing the action, (d) creates a serious risk to 
the health or safety of the public or a section of the public, or (e) is designed 
seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system.  (3) The 
use or threat of action falling within subsection (2) which involves the use of 
firearms or explosives is terrorism whether or not subsection (1)(b) is satisfied. 
 24.  Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 (Can.):  
‘terrorist activity’ means . . . (b) an act or 7 omission, in or outside Canada, (i) 
that is committed (A) in whole or in part for a political, religious or ideological 
purpose, objective or cause, and (B) in whole or in part with the intention of 
intimidating the public, or a segment of the public, with regard to its security, 
including its economic security, or compelling a person, a government or a 
domestic or an international organization to do or to refrain from doing any act, 
whether the public or the person, government or organization is inside or outside 
Canada, and (ii) that intentionally (A) causes death or serious bodily harm to a 
person by the use of violence, (B) endangers a person’s life, (C) causes a serious 
risk to the health or safety of the public or any segment of the public, (D) causes 
substantial property damage, whether to public or private property, if causing 
such damage is likely to result in the conduct or harm referred to in any of 
clauses (A) to (C), or (E) causes serious interference with or serious disruption 
of an essential service, facility or system, whether public or private, other than 
as a result of advocacy, protest, dissent or stoppage of work that is not intended 
to result in the conduct or harm referred to in any of clauses (A) to (C), and 
includes a conspiracy, attempt or threat to commit any such act or omission, or 
being an accessory after the fact or counseling in relation to any such act or 
omission, but, for greater certainty, does not include an act or omission that is 
committed during an armed conflict and that, at the time and in the place of its 
commission, is in accordance with customary international law or conventional 
international law applicable to the conflict, or the activities undertaken by 
military forces of a state in the exercise of their official duties, to the extent that 
those activities are governed by other rules of international law. 
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of the terror attack are ideological reasons.  However, while the definitions 
do share some common elements, there are also considerable differences 
amongst the various definitions.  Some provide that the primary focus of 
protection is the civilian population, while others expand this protection 
to cover military facilities as well.  A difficulty that becomes clear through 
review of these definitions is that all of them are drafted in a generalized 
form, which sometimes leads to sweeping application of them to legitimate 
actions that may take place under a democratic regime.25 
The differences among the various definitions and the generalized nature 
of their drafting illustrate the difficulty in defining the term “terrorism.”  
While it is one thing to come up with a clear definition for the term within 
a single country, it is entirely larger step to attempt to draft a universal, 
international and agreed upon definition of this term. Thus, despite the 
considerable importance of prescribing an agreed definition of the terrorism, 
which could facilitate adoption of international laws that better meet the 
needs of the modern realities within the context of the war on terror, it is 
unlikely that an agreement on an international definition will be reached 
in the near future. 
In light of this unlikelihood, the result is that the legal tools countries 
currently have for dealing with the threat of international terrorism are 
only the offenses that presently exist in international law, which imposes 
an obligation on every person as a person.26  In order to analyze whether 
these offenses are sufficient to provide a response to the struggle of 
countries against international terrorism, we shall examine the offenses in 
the Rome Statute (that fall within ICC jurisdiction), the attempts to include 
offenses in the Statute that relate to terrorism, and the actual jurisdiction of 
the Court over crimes of terrorism. 
B.  The Rome Statute 
The idea of creating an international criminal court was first raised in 
the Peace Treaty, which was executed at Versailles at the end of the First 
 
 25.  For instance, use of the sections of the law relating to terrorism for the purpose 
of suppressing legitimate protests or against aggressive actions taken by the police, which 
are aimed at preserving public order and which are effected proportionately. See EMANUEL 
GROSS, THE STRUGGLE OF DEMOCRACY AGAINST SUICIDE TERRORISM – IS THE FREE WORLD 
EQUIPPED WITH MORAL AND LEGAL TOOLS IN THIS STRUGGLE?, 219, 224 (Shulamit Almog 
& Dorit Beinish & Yaar Rotem eds., Dalia Dorner Books 2010). 
 26.  Gross, Democratic Struggle Against Terrorism, supra note 6, at 35. 
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World War.  After World War II, and following the atrocities that took 
place during the course of that War, the need to set up an international 
criminal court became even more acute. 27 During the subsequent decades, 
this initiative was stalled, mainly due to the political freeze, which was a 
result of the Cold War.  After the fall of the Soviet Union, however, there 
was again another push toward developing an international criminal court. 
At the start of the 1990s, following formidable disputes in Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda, the U.N. General Assembly decided to advance the preparation 
of a constitution for an international criminal court.28 The Rome Statute,29 
which sets up the International Criminal Court, was passed with the support 
of 120 countries, despite the opposition of 7 countries (including the 
United States, China and Israel).30 
The Court (ICC) commenced operating in July 2002. The ICC was set 
up as a permanent judicial entity that would handle crimes of international 
importance.  As distinct from special ad hoc tribunals, which were set up 
after the commission of severe crimes during armed conflicts, the Court is a 
permanent institution and can thus provide significant ex-ante deterrence.31  
The Court’s jurisdiction covers four classes of offenses, which are defined 
in its constitution:32 genocide,33 crimes against humanity,34 war crimes,35 
and the crime of aggression. The first three crimes are set out clearly in 
accordance with the principle of legality, in Articles 6-8 of the Constitution 
of the Court.  On the other hand, the crime of aggression was not initially 
defined in the Constitution.  There had been a desire to include crimes of 
terrorism under this category, but that desire was overwhelmed by the lack 
of agreement among countries drafting the Constitution, as to the definition 
of “terrorism.”36 Therefore, the crime of aggression offense was enacted 
with the express condition that the Court would only be able to exercise 
its jurisdiction over the crime of aggression if it adopts a provision 
 
 27.  Alan Baker, The International Criminal Court (ICC), 16 L. & MIL. 879, 880 
(2003) (Isr.). 
 28.  Id. at 881. 
 29.  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 
(July 17, 1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
 30.  Shavit Matias & Miri Sharon, The International Criminal Court, 9 HAMISHPAT 
23, 24 (2004) (Isr.). 
 31.  ORNA BEN-NAPHTALI & YUVAL SHANI, INTERNATIONAL LAW BETWEEN WAR 
AND PEACE 320 (Tali Nir ed., 2006) (Isr.). 
 32.  Rome Statute, supra note 29, at art. 5(1). 
 33.  Id. at art. 6. 
 34.  Id. at art. 7. 
 35.  Id. at art. 8. 
 36.  Gross, Democratic Struggle Against Terrorism, supra note 6, at 697. 
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defining the crime.37  In fact, this provision remains, and continues to 
render the offense a dead letter in the ICC’s Constitution today. 
The crime of terrorism, however, is defined as one of the crimes that 
fall under the jurisdiction of the Court at all.  The draft of the Statute 
included a definition of the term “terrorism,”38 which sought to include 
acts of terror within the jurisdiction of the Court.39  Nevertheless, there 
has been no international agreement on the definition of the term “terrorism.”  
The objection to defining terrorism and including it within ICC jurisdiction 
has come primarily from Western countries.  They were concerned about 
politicization of the discourse and felt that it would be better to allow this 
crime to be handled by national judicial instances.40 
 
 37.  Rome Statute, supra note 29, at art. 5(2). 
 38.  U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/2 (Vol. III), art. 5 (July 17, 1999) 
[hereinafter U.N. Diplomatic Conference], provides as follows:  
For the purposes of the present Statute, crimes of terrorism means: (1) Undertaking, 
organizing, sponsoring, ordering, facilitating, financing, encouraging or tolerating 
acts of violence against another State directed at persons or property and of such 
a nature as to create terror, fear or insecurity in the minds of public figures, 
groups of persons, the general public or populations, for whatever considerations 
and purposes of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or 
such other nature that may be invoked to justify them; (2) An offence under the 
following Conventions: (a) Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
against the Safety of Civil Aviation; (b) Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft; (c) Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents; 
(d) International Convention against the Taking of Hostages; (e) Convention for 
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation; (f) 
Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed 
Platforms located on the Continental Shelf; (3) An offence involving use of 
firearms, weapons, explosives and dangerous substances when used as a means 
to perpetuate indiscriminate violence involving death or serious bodily injury to 
persons or groups of persons or populations or serious damage to property. 
 39.  U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/13 (Vol. I) (1998) [hereinafter U.N. 
Diplomatic Conference]. 
 40.  Baker, supra note 27, at 883. This argument does not hold water because the 
concern of politicization is not unique to terrorism, and could arise with respect to the 
existing offenses in the Rome Statute.  For example, Israel chose not to become a party to 
the Rome Statute (despite its involvement in the establishment of the Court), because of 
its objection to including the settlement of populations in occupied territory as being a war 
crime.  This is a politically explosive issue, which is at the core of the Israel-Palestinian 
dispute. See also Aviv Cohen, Prosecuting Terrorists at the International Criminal Court: 
Reevaluating an Unused Legal Tool to Combat Terrorism, 20:2 MICH. ST. INT’L L. REV. 
219 passim (2011). 
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The principal arguments for excluding the crime of terrorism from ICC 
jurisdiction include: that the crime of terrorism is of a substantially different 
nature than other crimes defined in the Statute, a concern that the Court 
will be overburdened with cases that are of lesser importance, and that 
states are better able to deal with such crimes efficiently within their 
internal laws.41  A number of countries submitted a proposal for inclusion 
of the crime of terrorism under the commission of crimes against humanity,42 
but that proposal was rejected as well.43 Lastly, the final version of the 
Rome Statute stated that acts of terrorism are: “serious crimes of concern 
to the international community,”44 but the crime of terrorism was not defined 
or included within the jurisdiction of the Court. 
In 2009, the countries convened once again, in another attempt to 
formulate a definition of the term crime of aggression, but once again, 
without success.  For that reason, the argument was made that the existing 
offenses are sufficient and that there is no need to formulate an agreed-
upon definition for the crime of aggression.45 In 2010, the countries met 
one more time in an attempt to formulate a universally acceptable wording.  
After two weeks of intensive discussions, and on the basis of years of 
preparatory work, an amendment was made to the Rome Statute, and a 
definition of the crime of aggression was passed:46 
  
 
 41.  Herman von Hebel & Darryl Robinson, Crimes Within the Jurisdiction of the 
Court, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE 86 
(Roy S. K. Lee, ed., 1999). 
 42.  U.N. Diplomatic Conference, supra note 39. 
(i) An act of terrorism, in all its forms and manifestations involving the use of 
indiscriminate violence, committed against innocent persons or property intended or 
calculated to provoke a state of terror, fear and insecurity in the minds of the 
general public or populations resulting in death or serious bodily injury, or injury 
to mental or physical health and serious damage to property irrespective of any 
considerations and purposes of a political, ideological, philosophical, racial, 
ethnic, religious or of such other nature that may be invoked to justify it, is a 
crime.(ii) This crime shall also include any serious crime which is the subject 
matter of a multilateral convention for the elimination of international terrorism 
which obliges the parties hereto either to extradite or to prosecute an offender. 
 43.  See Proposal Submitted by India, Sri Lanka and Turkey, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 
183/C.1/L.27/Rev.1 (July 6, 1998); Johan D. van der Vyver, Prosecuting Terrorism in 
International Tribunals, 24 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 527, 538 (2010). 
 44.  Final Act, U.N. Diplomatic Conference, Doc. A/CONF.138/10, annex I, res. (e) 
(July 17, 1998) [hereinafter Final Act]. 
 45.  Report of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, ICC ASP/7/ 
20/Add.1, annex II, ¶ 13, http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ICC-ASP-7-20-Add.1-
SWGCA%20English.pdf. 
 46.  The Crime of Aggression, COALITION  FOR THE INT’L CRIM. CT. (last visited Mar. 
1, 2016), http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=aggression.  
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‘Crime of aggression’ means the planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by 
a person in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or 
military action of a State, of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity 
and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations.47 
Not only does the crime of aggression fail to define “terrorism” or what 
constitutes an “act of terrorism,” but this definition does not even relate to 
crimes perpetrated by private individuals or by organizations.  According 
to the definition, the crime of aggression is perpetrated by a person with 
the ability to direct the actions of a state. The definition of the term, “act 
of aggression,” itself, is narrow, and only covers acts done by one state to 
another state.48  The significance of this is that once again, the ICC had 
the possibility of updating the laws of war and of equipping states with 
tools appropriate to the modern war against terrorism, but has instead 
preserved the anachronistic concept that the only kind of war is a conflict 
between two sovereign states.  According to the position of the Court, it 
only has the possibility of retaining jurisdiction over cases involving acts 
of terrorism if those acts fall within the ambit of the crimes defined in the 
Constitution.49 
Thus, to date, the international community has not yet been able to 
adopt an agreed-upon definition of crimes of terrorism, despite the ever-
increasing terrorist activity harming more countries around the world— 
even those countries that saw themselves, until recently, as being immune 
to such acts.  Ultimately, however, the increase in international terrorism 
will force the international community to reach an agreement regarding 
the nature of terrorism.50 
III. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN COMBATANTS AND CIVILIANS 
A. The Gist of the Distinction and the Two Category Approach 
The Geneva Conventions (1949) are four conventions whose main 
purpose is to protect individuals at times of hostilities and to impose 
 
 47.  Rome Statute, supra note 29, at art. 8(1). 
 48.  Id. at art. 8(2): “‘act of aggression’ means the use of armed force by a State 
against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or 
in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.” 
 49.  Can the ICC deal with terrorist acts within its existing jurisdiction?, ICC (last visited 
Mar. 1, 2016), http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/about%20the%20court/frequently% 
20asked%20questions/Pages/16.aspx. 
 50.  Gross, Democratic Struggle Against Terrorism, supra note 6, at 41. 
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restrictions on the powers of combat forces.51 The two conventions that 
are relevant to the concerns with respect to illegal combatants are the 
Third Convention, regarding the protection of prisoners of war,52 and the 
Fourth Convention, regarding the protection of civilians during wartimes.53 
The Geneva Conventions only apply to international disputes on the basis 
of the understanding that armed hostilities that are not international are 
covered by criminal law.54 Two supplementary Protocols were added to 
the Geneva Conventions in 1977.  The First Protocol deals with the 
resolution of international disputes,55 and the Second Protocol deals with 
local disputes.56  The First Protocol expands the definition of war, and 
includes national liberation wars for the first time. The understanding was 
that these asymmetrical disputes between a state and a guerilla organization 
increase concerns regarding the separation of the laws of warfare, and 
cause harm to the distinction between civilians and combatants.57  The 
Supplementary Protocols specifically address the issue of combatants who 
are not part of a regular and organized state military force for the first 
time.58 
The First Protocol prescribes a basic rule—there is a duty to distinguish 
between combatants and military targets as opposed to civilians and 
civilian targets,59 the former being legitimate targets of military attack 
while the latter not being part of hostilities and being prohibited for 
intentional attack.60  This duty, which is known as the “principle of distinction”, 
is one of the “foundation[al] stones of humanitarian law.”61 The principle 
of distinction is set out, inter alia, in Article 48 of the First Protocol: 
 
 51.  BEN-NAPHTALI & SHANI, supra note 31, at 130. 
 52.  Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 
1949, 6 U.S.T 3316, 75 U.N.T.S 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention]. 
 53.  Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. 
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention]. 
 54.  EVEN CHEN, supra note 11, at 48. 
 55.  Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and relating 
to the Protection of the Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977 (Protocol 
I) 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter First Protocol]. Note that the First Protocol constitutes 
customary law, and thus, also binds those states that have not ratified it, including Israel. 
See Knut Dormann, Obligations of International Humanitarian Law, 4(2) MIL. & STRATEGIC 
AFF. 11, 12 (2012) (Isr.) [hereinafter Dormann, Duties]. 
 56.  First Protocol, supra note 55, at 609. 
 57.  EVEN CHEN, supra note 11, at 48–50. 
 58.  Id. at 47. 
 59.  Gross, Democratic Struggle Against Terrorism, supra note 6, at 661. 
 60.  There are certain conditions under which a civilian population may be attacked.  
I will discuss those below, in the context of the principle of proportionality. See infra Part 
III, at 214–17. 
 61.  Even Chen, supra note 11, at 21. 
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In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and civilian 
objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the  
civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military 
objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military 
objectives.62 
This Article imposes a duty on states to distinguish between the civilian 
population and the armed forces, and permits them to harm military 
targets only.63  In addition to this general duty, the principle of distinction 
imposes specific duties both on the attacking force and on the force being 
attacked.64  The attacking force, for instance, is prohibited from indiscriminate 
attacks, such as those that are not directed at a specific military target or 
attacks whose impact cannot be limited due to use of particular combat 
measures.65 The force being attacked is under a duty to employ precautionary 
measures in order to protect its civilians against the impact of military 
attacks.  Among other things, it must move civilians away from military 
targets and avoid placing military targets within or near to population 
centers.66 
A common argument among commentators on international law is that 
this fundamental rule leaves only two categories in the Geneva Conventions 
—civilians and civilian targets, and combatants and military targets.  In 
addition to this, the First Protocol includes a definition of the term 
“civilian,”67 which provides that a civilian is any person who is not a 
combatant.68 In this way, the Protocol actually reinforces the dichotomous 
distinction between civilians and combatants.69 The classification of a 
person as a civilian or a combatant has implications on the protections that 
apply to such person, and on the rights to which he is entitled.70 This 
means that the legality of a military action depends on whether its target 
 
 62.  First Protocol, supra note 55, art. 48. 
 63.  See id. 
 64.  See id. art. 51. 
 65.  Id. art. 51(4). 
 66.  Id. art. 58. 
 67.  Id. art. 50. 
 68.  It is easy to see that this definition is a negative definition.  If we examine 
whether a particular person fits the definition of a combatant, and if we find that he does 
not meet the criteria, then that means that he is a civilian.  Below, I will discuss the problems 
that arise from this definition, particularly in the specific context of terrorists and terrorist 
organizations. See infra Part IV, at 217–20. 
 69.  See First Protocol, supra note 55, art. 50. 
 70.  Curtis A. Bradley, The United States, Israel and Unlawful Combatants, 12 Green 
Bag 2d 397, 398–99 (2009). 
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falls within one of two categories: whilst it is possible to exercise force 
against any military target, apart from a small number of exceptions,71 
harm to civilians is, as a rule, prohibited.72 
In the specific context of terrorism, we can see that harm to the principle 
of distinction is a central characteristic of the activities of terrorist  
organizations.73 Firstly, terrorist activities are usually directed towards 
harming civilians.  This can be seen in the terror attack that occurred in 
France in early 2016,74 the central purpose of which was to harm civilians.  
That is, of course, only one example of many, and many acts of terrorism 
which take place around the world are done intentionally in order to harm 
as many civilians, and civilian infrastructure, as possible.75 Secondly, 
terrorists hide among the civilian population and exploit the protections 
reserved for such population.76 
With respect to the way in which states cope with terrorist organizations, 
this categorization is particularly important since it has a direct impact on 
the scope of operations available to the state.  This is because if terrorists 
fall within the category of combatants, then they can be harmed and if 
they are taken prisoner, they are entitled to the status of prisoner-of-war.  
But if they are civilians, they are immune to harm except in a small number 
of circumstances.77 Therefore, the status of terrorists in international law 
is a critical factor which affects the rules that a state has in the war on 
terror. 
 
 71.  First Protocol, supra note 55, art. 12, 15.  These exceptions include religious or 
medical teams. 
 72.  Id. art. 48.  A primary exception to this is civilians who take an active part 
in hostilities, on which more below. 
 73.  Gross, Democratic Struggle Against Terrorism, supra note 6, at 597–98. 
 74.  See supra Introduction. 
 75.  See Associated Press, After Deadly Kenya Assault, al-Shabab Warns of More 
Attacks, HAARETZ (Isr.), Apr. 4, 2015, http://www.haaretz.com/world-news/1.650480. 
Another current example of this is the attack at the university in Kenya, in which terrorists 
belonging to the A-Shabab organization killed 147 students.  The attack was apparently 
carried out in revenge against the Kenyan government’s policy in Somalia.  This is another 
example of how terrorism is used on the civilian population in order to send a message to 
government.  Additionally, we can see, once again, that the phenomenon of international 
terrorism is not a problem reserved for certain countries only, but rather, is an international 
problem that harms many countries; for a description of this attack and the reasons why it 
was perpetrated. 
 76.  EVEN CHEN, supra note 11, at 40. 
 77.  This issue will be discussed at length in the next chapter. See infra Part IV. 
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B.  The Principle of Proportionality 
The principle of proportionality is the natural derivative of the principle 
of distinction.  Once a particular target has been deemed to be legitimate,78 
it is necessary to examine the proportionality of the military operation 
required to attack it, prior to such an attack.79 This principle states that a 
prohibited military operation is an operation in which the damage to 
humanitarian interests that might arise as a result of it is disproportionately 
greater than the military benefit expected from the operation.80 Article 
51(5)(b) of the First Protocol provides that a prohibited military operation is: 
[A]n attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian, injury to 
civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation 
to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.81 
The significance of this provision is that the attacking party must balance 
between the damage that will be caused to the civilian population (both in 
loss of life and injury and in damage to civilian objects) and the military 
benefit that will be obtained through harming the specific target.82 Apart 
from the duty to balance the damage to humanitarian interests against the 
expected military benefit, the military force is under a duty by virtue of 
the principle of proportionality to employ precautionary measures to 
minimize, as far as possible, the expected auxiliary damage to the civilian 
population as a result of a military operation.83 We can see that the 
principle of proportionality erodes, to some extent, the dichotomous 
distinction between civilian targets that are not legitimate targets of attack 
and military targets that are a legitimate target of military attack.  The 
 
 78.  E.g., the target is permissible for attack under the rules of international law, and 
particularly under the principle of distinction which was discussed in the previous chapter. 
See supra Part III, at 212. 
 79.  See generally Gross, Democratic Struggle Against Terrorism, supra note 6, at 
217–26; BEN-NAPHTALI & SHANI, supra note 31, at 147–50. Proportionality relates to two 
more terms which I will not discuss in this paper: the principle of military necessity and 
the right of a state to self-defense.  These two terms assist in determining when a particular 
military operation will be proportionate.  The principle of military necessity provides that 
it is possible to harm humanitarian interests only where such harm serves a military necessity.  
According to the doctrine of self-defense, military force must be exercised proportionately 
to the threat. 
 80.  BEN-NAPHTALI & SHANI, supra note 31, at 154. 
 81.  First Protocol, supra note 55, art. 51(5)(b). 
 82.  Dormann, Duties, supra note 55, at 16. 
 83.  BEN-NAPHTALI & SHANI, supra note 31, at 155. 
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principle of proportionality, as drafted in Article 51 of the First Protocol, 
in fact provides that harm to civilian targets is legitimate in the case of 
auxiliary harm.84 
With respect to the de facto implementation of the principle of 
proportionality, three main issues arise.  The first relates to the difficulty 
in foreseeing the outcome of a particular military operation.85 A second 
difficulty is the fact that an assessment of the proportionality of a given 
military operation is naturally a subjective assessment, and therefore, 
different lawyers might give different answers regarding the proportionality 
of the operation.86 The third difficulty is the relationship between the 
principle of proportionality and the wish to protect armed forces. The wish 
to avoid injury to combatants is a legitimate consideration but it cannot 
justify a sharp deviation from the principle of proportionality in the event 
of serious harm to humanitarian interests.87 
When a state has to deal with the threat of terrorism, the difficulty in 
implementing the principle of proportionality is even greater, and there 
are many questions to which there is no response.  Terrorist organizations 
do not operate in accordance with the principle of distinction and hide 
among the civilian population.  Therefore, when the state seeks to harm 
them, such harm might very reasonably also cause harm to a civilian 
population or to humanitarian interests.  Does the “roof knock” procedure,88 
employed by the IDF prior to bombing buildings in the Gaza Strip, for 
instance, accord with the principle of proportionality?  And when a 
message is given to civilians in a building prior to such a bombing,89 is 
this in accordance with the rules of international law? If, after the notice, 
 
 84.  EVEN CHEN, supra note 11, at 116. 
 85.  See generally BEN-NAPHTALI & SHANI, supra note 31, at 155–56. This difficulty 
was examined by the Commission that investigated NATO bombings in Yugoslavia.  
Although the Commission noted that it is easy to recognize the principle of proportionality 
and hard to implement it, it set a number of subsidiary tests, in addition, which will help 
in determining whether a certain military operation constitutes a deviation from the 
principle of proportionality.  These tests include: whether there are alternate measures 
which may be used to obtain a similar military outcome with less damage to humanitarian 
interests, whether the military forces were actually aware of the expected damage, whether 
the deviation from the principle of proportionality is a blatant one. 
 86.  Id. at 156. 
 87.  Id. at 157. 
 88.  In the “roof knock” procedure, an  aircraft bombs a building designated for destruction 
with a low grade explosive first, with the purpose of warning the civilians inside the building 
that the building is about to be destroyed.  Several minutes later, the bomb intended to 
destroy the building is dropped. See Rubi Sebel, Thoughts on the Goldstone Report and 
International Law, 2 L. ON THE SPOT 55, 74 (2000). 
 89.  As happened during Operation Protective Edge, in the summer of 2014.YOAV 
ZAYTOUN, Telephone call or SMS before the bomb: the “Roof Knock” Procedure, YNET 
(Isr.) (July 8, 2014), http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4539781,00.html. 
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civilians consciously choose to remain in the building, is there a duty not 
to bomb, as a result of the principle of proportionality?  These questions 
show the fact that international humanitarian law does not equip states 
with suitable tools for combating the threat of terrorism.  The principle of 
proportionality is vague and difficult to implement in every armed conflict, 
but the difficulty and vagueness are increased in the case of a dispute 
between a state and a terrorist organization. 
In the special context of international terrorism, the requirement of 
proportionality must be interpreted more broadly than the accepted 
interpretation with respect to wars between sovereign states.  The principle 
of proportionality is an exception to the principle of distinction, which 
enables harm to the civilian population and civilian targets under certain 
circumstances.  If we interpret the principle of proportionality in a narrow 
way, the ability of states to harm terrorists will be harmed since they will 
not be able to harm terrorists who hide among civilian populations.90 A 
broader interpretation of the requirement of proportionality must balance 
the need to prevent harm to innocent civilians and the humanitarian interests 
of the civilian population against the need of a state to protect its citizens 
against terrorist attacks perpetrated from population centers. 
IV.  THE STATUS OF TERRORISTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The principle of distinction, as aforementioned, gives rise to the duty set 
out in international law of distinguishing between civilians and combatants.  
The classification of a person as a civilian or a combatant will impact on 
the defenses that he is entitled to, and as result of that, on the possibility 
of harming him.  At present, the status of terrorists is not explicitly defined 
in international law and therefore, it is necessary to examine whether they 
fall within the definition of one of the currently existing categories. This 
section set out each of these categories and the conditions required in 
order to come within them.  Next, this section will examine whether 
terrorists fall within either of the existing categories, or one of the sub-
 
 90.  An example of this can be seen with respect to the use of civilians as human 
shields.  A side that uses its own civilians as human shields clearly perpetrates a war crime.  
However, the question that arises is what duties apply to the other side in such a situation.  
Is it permissible to harm such civilians? In the event that they volunteer to be “human 
shields”, do they become combatants? According to the interpretation of the Red Cross, in 
the event that one side uses civilians as human shields, the other side must act to the best 
of its ability to avoid harming them, and it makes no difference whether the human shields 
are voluntary or coerced.  See Sebel, supra note 88, at 65–67. 
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categories.  The answer to this question will be based on two main parameters: 
first, whether the terrorists meet the conditions required in order to be 
included in a particular category; and second, whether terrorists should be 
recognized as being included in the category and therefore as being entitled 
to all of the protections granted thereunder, in light of the fact that they 
operate in complete contravention of the rules of international law. 
A. Should Terrorists be Recognized as Combatants? 
Armed forces are defined in Article 43 of the First Protocol, as follows: 
1. The armed forces of a Party to a conflict consist of all organized armed forces, 
groups and units which are under a command responsible to that Party for the 
conduct of its subordinates, even if that Party is represented by a government or 
an authority not recognized by an adverse Party. Such armed forces shall be 
subject to an internal disciplinary system which, ‘inter alia’, shall enforce compliance 
with the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict. 2. Members of 
the armed forces of a Party to a conflict (other than medical personnel and 
chaplains covered by Article 33 of the Third Convention) are combatants, that is 
to say, they have the right to participate directly in hostilities.91 
This Article sets out a number of substantive matters.  Firstly, sub-
Article (1) provides that the armed forces of a party to a conflict are all of 
the forces, groups, and units which are under a command responsible for 
the conduct of its subordinates.  This definition is valid, also, in the event 
that a party to a conflict is represented by a government or an authority 
that is not recognized by the other party.  In addition, the Article imposes 
a duty on the armed forces to act in accordance with the rules of  
international law that apply to international armed conflicts.  Sub-Article 
(2) defines combatants as members of the armed forces of one of the 
parties to the conflict, and therefore as being entitled to participate directly 
in the hostilities.  In addition to this right, international law permits combatants 
to harm military targets and to kill enemy soldiers,92 and prohibits them 
from being prosecuted for actions taken during wartime.93 
As noted above, the legality of a military operation depends, first and 
foremost, on its purpose.  Contrary to the situation with the civilian population, 
which is, as a rule, protected against attack, it is possible to act militarily 
against any military target (apart from religious and medical teams),94 and 
it is possible to take legal combatants prisoner until the end of hostilities, 
even without proving a specific need to hold them.95  However, even during 
 
 91.  First Protocol, supra note 55, art. 43. 
 92.  First Protocol, supra note 55, art. 48. 
 93.  Id. art. 75. 
 94.  Bradley, supra note 70, at 398. 
 95.  Id. 
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a military conflict with combat forces, not all actions are permissible. 
In cases where combatants voluntarily or forcibly leave the arena of combat 
and are captured by the enemy, they are entitled to the status of prisoners 
of war.  The guiding principles with respect to prisoners of war were set 
out in the three First Geneva Conventions and the First Protocol.  Recognition 
of combatants as prisoners of war provides them with a considerable number 
of rights.  Inter alia, prisoners of war are entitled to humanitarian treatment, 
their captors are required to keep them alive and healthy,96 and, upon the 
conclusion of hostilities, they must be immediately released.97  In addition, 
they cannot be prosecuted for their actions during wartime, nor can they 
be punished for such actions.98 There is an exception in cases where 
international humanitarian law has been breached and particularly in 
situations that amount to war crimes.99 
The entitlement to the status of prisoner of war is the most substantial 
result of belonging to the category of combatant and is the broadest 
protection granted to those included in this category.  Only a legal combatant, 
who honors the principle of distinction and distinguishes himself from the 
civilian population, will be entitled to all of the protections afforded by 
the status of prisoner of war, the first and foremost of which being immunity 
from criminal prosecution.  This rule encourages combatants to act in 
accordance with the principle of distinction and therefore once again 
expresses the purpose of international humanitarian law of defending 
civilians during wartime.100 
As for terrorists, it would appear that according to the definition of 
“armed forces” in Article 43 of the First Protocol, they cannot be recognized 
as combatants since they do not constitute a military force belonging to 
one of the states that are a party to a conflict.  Even if it is possible to view 
a terrorist organization as a military framework that belongs to one of the 
parties to the conflict, which has a command responsible for the conduct 
of its subordinates (and therefore does, prima facie, comply with the first 
part of sub-section (1)) the terrorists, by their actions, methodically breach 
the rules of international law and therefore, they are not in compliance 
with the duty set out at the end of the Article. 
 
 96.  Third Geneva Convention, supra note 52, art. 12–13. 
 97.  Id. art. 118. 
 98.  Knut Dormann, The Legal Situation of Unlawful/Unprivileged Combats, 85 
IRRC 45 (2003) [hereinafter Dormann, Legal Situation]. 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  BEN-NAPHTALI & SHANI, supra note 31, at 162. 
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If we recognize members of terrorist organizations as combatants, the 
consequences of such will be that imprisoned terrorists would be entitled 
to the status of prisoners of war and the state fighting the terrorist 
organization would not be able to prosecute them for their actions during 
fighting.101 If terrorists, who do not comply with international laws, are 
entitled to the protections that are afforded to combatants, this will in fact 
create an incentive for deviation from the international laws of war.102 The 
conclusion that arises from this is that if we wish to preserve the basic 
distinction between civilians and combatants during the course of hostilities, 
we must impose sanctions on those who try to harm this distinction,103 and 
therefore terrorists must not be recognized as legal combatants. 
B.  Should Terrorists be Recognized as Freedom Fighters? 
The 1949 Geneva Conventions were drafted in light of the classic 
structure of European warfare, and therefore, they did not adopt the idea 
of including freedom fighters as being legal combatants, with all of the 
implications of such.  The need to recognize freedom fighters arose in the 
years after the passage of the Geneva Conventions and therefore this issue 
was added to the First Protocol.  In this way, the protection was extended 
to cover combatants who are not a part of official armed forces.104  The 
background for recognition of this sub-category was a colonial reality and 
an acceptance of the need of civilians living under foreign occupation to 
fight for their independence and their right to self-determination.  The 
primary legal significance of this recognition was the affording of prisoner-
of-war protection to freedom fighters.105 
The Third Geneva Convention, which deals with prisoners of war, sets 
out the categories of combatants who are entitled to the status of prisoner 
of war.106 Among other things, the Convention refers to “organized resistance 
movements,”107 which belong to one of the parties fighting in the conflict.  
Combatants operating in the framework of these organizations will be 
entitled to prisoner-of-war protection if they fulfill the following cumulative 
 
 101.  This immunity against prosecution applies subject to their actions not constituting a 
breach of humanitarian rules, and particularly with respect to war crimes or crimes against 
humanity.  However, it is not possible to prosecute them for criminal offenses committed 
by them.  The result is that it will only be possible to prosecute terrorists in the event that 
their actions amount to crimes against humanity or war crimes, as such are defined in 
international law. 
 102.  See Bradley, supra note 70, at 401. 
 103.  See Gross, Democratic Struggle Against Terrorism, supra note 6, at 662. 
 104.  Id. at 661. 
 105.  See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 52, art. 4. 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  Id.  art. 4(2). 
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conditions: (1) a person who is responsible for his subordinates is in command 
of them; (2) they wear identification symbols that are visible from afar; 
(3) they carry their weapons visibly; (4) they operate in accordance with the 
rules and customs of war.  These conditions, which determine who will be 
entitled to the status of prisoner of war, are aimed at preserving the distinction 
between civilians and combatants.  The second and third conditions were 
intended to assist soldiers in distinguishing between enemy forces and the 
civilian population.  The first and fourth conditions were set out with the 
aim of ensuring that the rules regarding the prohibition against injuring 
civilians and the duty of combatants to distinguish themselves from the 
civilian populace are upheld.108 
In addition, the First Protocol expands the definition of combatant and 
also covers freedom fighters:109 combatants who are not part of a state or 
recognized authority, but who are considered to be combatants, and 
therefore are entitled to prisoner-of-war protection.  The Protocol limits 
the affording of protection only to those who are subject to the international 
rules that apply to combatants.110 Moreover, a number of other conditions 
have been set which freedom fighters must comply with in order to obtain 
the status of prisoners of war.  A party to a conflict which brings paramilitary 
fighters into its forces is under an obligation to inform the other parties of 
this.111 This condition is necessary in order to entitle the combatants to 
prisoner-of-war protection.112 
As for the status of terrorists, the question that arises is whether, after 
reaching the conclusion that they cannot be included in the category of 
combatants, they should be recognized as freedom fighters.  As noted 
above, the actual question is whether terrorists fulfill the four cumulative 
conditions the performance of which will entitle them to the status of 
prisoners of war. 
With respect to the duty of distinction from the civilian population, 
which is not upheld in the case of terrorist organizations, the First Protocol 
set out an exception that provides that a combatant will retain his status 
 
 108.  John C. Yoo, The Status of Soldiers and Terrorist under the Geneva Conventions, 3 
CHINESE J. INTL’L L. 135, 141 (2004). 
 109.  First Protocol, supra note 55, art. 43. 
 110.  Id. art. 43(1). This condition is also expressed in Article 4(2)(d) which provides 
that one of the conditions required in order to be considered a prisoner of war is: “That of 
conducting their operations in according with the law and customs of war.” Third Geneva 
Convention, supra note 52, art. 4(2)(d). 
 111.  First Protocol, supra note 55, art. 43(3). 
 112.  Gross, Democratic Struggle Against Terrorism, supra note 6, at 662–63. 
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so long as he carries his weapon visibly, even if he does not distinguish 
himself from the civilian population.113 The significance of this exception 
is that the duty of distinction is a relative duty, and in certain circumstances, 
a combatant will only need to carry his weapon visibly in order for 
distinction to be made out.  In addition, even if combatants do not comply 
with this single condition, they will be entitled to the status of prisoners 
of war, including all of the relevant protections, except for immunity 
against prosecution.114  Israel, the United States, and Great Britain argued 
that this exception allows terrorists to be recognized as freedom fighters, 
and as a result, to gain the rights that are owed to prisoners of war, and 
therefore refused to sign the Protocol.115 
Even if, pursuant to the exception, terrorists can be deemed to be 
freedom fighters, it must be recalled that another condition for recognition 
is the running of their operations in accordance with the laws and customs 
of war.  Clearly, terrorists do not operate in accordance with the rules of 
international law and their principal purpose in warfare is to harm 
civilians.  Therefore, the conclusion is that if terrorist organizations and 
their operatives do not respect the rules of international law and do not act 
in accordance with them, they cannot be deemed to be freedom fighters 
and they are not entitled to the protections that are granted to combatants.116 
In addition, terrorists do not comply with the conditions of Article 44(3) 
of the First Protocol, which prescribes situations in which a combatant, or 
a freedom fighter, loses his status.  The purpose of this Article is to ensure 
the protection of the civilian population against military actions.117 This 
Article provides that combatants must distinguish themselves from the 
civilian population when engaging in combat operations and when preparing 
for them, and if they cannot do so, they must, at least, carry their weapons 
visibly.118 Terrorists do not distinguish themselves from the civilian 
 
 113.  First Protocol, supra note 55, art. 44(3). This Article is part of the trend which 
is, to an extent, characteristic of the First Protocol, and that is expansion of the application 
of international humanitarian law to disputes that are not between states.  That is, as noted 
above, due to the recognition of the right of national liberation organizations to act for 
their national independence.  However, the concern that arises is that the Protocol will be 
taken too far, since it might encourage terrorist organizations to act in a way that blurs the 
distinction between civilians and combatants.  Alex Markels, Will Terrorism Rewrite the 
Laws of War?, NPR (Dec. 6, 2005), http://www.npr.org/2005/12/06/5011464/will-terrorism-
rewrite-the-laws-of-war (updated Aug. 2, 2012). See also BEN-NAPHTALI & SHANI, supra 
note 31, at 166–68. 
 114.  BEN-NAPHTALI & SHANI, supra note 31, at 167. 
 115.  Gross, Democratic Struggle Against Terrorism, supra note 6, at 674. 
 116.  Id. at 662. 
 117.  Id. at 661. 
 118.  Id. at 661–62. In such a case, in which combatants/freedom fighters are unable 
to distinguish themselves from the civilian population but do carry their weapons visibly, 
they will not lose their status as combatants. Id. 
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population and do not carry their weapons visibly, and therefore they do 
not meet the conditions of this Article and are not entitled to the protections 
that apply to freedom fighters.119 
Finally, the sub-category of freedom fighters was aimed at recognizing 
the legitimacy of national liberation wars intended to enable independence 
and self-determination to peoples subject to colonial occupation.120  Those 
are the armed conflicts that the authors of the Protocols had in mind.121  
The easing of the conditions required in order to obtain recognition as a 
combatant certainly did not have the intention of justifying a war aimed 
at destroying a democratic regime and establishing a new world order.122 
Therefore, it would appear not to be appropriate for a person acting in 
contravention of the rules of international humanitarian law, who has the 
aim of harming civilians, to be entitled to the protections granted to 
freedom fighters.123 
C.  Should Terrorists be Recognized as Civilians? 
Article 50 of the First Protocol defines who is a civilian and who is the 
civilian population: 
1. A civilian is any person who does not belong to one of the categories of persons 
referred to in Article 4 A (1), (2), (3) and (6) of the Third Convention and in 
Article 43 of this Protocol. In case of doubt whether a person is a civilian, that 
person shall be considered to be a civilian. 2. The civilian population comprises 
all persons who are civilians. 3. The presence within the civilian population of 
individuals who do not come within the definition of civilians does not deprive 
the population of its civilian character.124 
It is clear that a civilian is anyone who does not belong to “armed 
forces.”125 Article 50 is defined negatively and therefore, it would appear, 
prima facie, that anyone who is not a combatant falls under the category 
of civilian.126 The Hague Conventions, the Geneva Conventions and the 
First Protocol set out, unequivocally, that civilians and civilian targets are 
 
 119.  Id. 
 120.  See id. at 662–63. 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  EVEN CHEN, supra note 11, at 23. 
 123.  Gross, Democratic Struggle Against Terrorism, supra note 6, at 662. 
 124.  First Protocol, supra note 55, art. 50. 
 125.  As defined in Article 43 of the First Protocol. Id. art. 43. 
 126.  Id. art. 50. 
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not legitimate targets of attack.127 Not only violence against civilians and 
civilian targets is prohibited, but there is also a prohibition against 
threatening violence with the principal aim of terrorizing the civilian 
prohibition.128 Protection of the civilian population is also expressed via 
the precautions that must be taken prior to affecting an attack.129 Apart 
from the general protections of the civilian population, the international 
laws of war note specific targets that are immune to attack.130 
It is clear that the protection of civilians is a very broad protection.  
Combatants are prohibited from intentionally harming the civilian population; 
they must avoid, as far as possible, harming civilians during the course of 
hostilities and they must distinguish themselves from the civilian population 
as well.  In addition, civilians are prohibited from taking part in combat 
operations and they are open to harm when they take part in such operations.  
These two components are closely connected to one another—a prohibition 
against soldiers harming the civilian population whilst being attacked by 
the civilian population would be unfair.131 
As for terrorists, if it is not appropriate to view them as combatants, 
then a fortiori they must not be viewed as civilians and given the broader 
protections that are granted to this category.  Terrorists are not innocent 
civilians who are caught up in hostilities, whom international law seeks to 
protect, but rather, are illegal combatants who take an active part in the 
hostilities, in breach of the international laws of war. 
  
 
 127.  Gross, Democratic Struggle Against Terrorism, supra note 6, at 661. E.g., First 
Protocol, supra note 55, art. 51. Article 51, headed “Protection of the Civilian Population,” 
provides, in subsection (1), general protection for the civilian population against “dangers 
due to military operations,” and subsections (2)–(8) set out specific protections against 
threats of violence and indiscriminate attacks. Id. 
 128.  First Protocol, supra note 55, art. 51(2). 
 129.  Firstly, it is necessary to ensure that the targets of the attack are not civilian and 
that there is no prohibition against attacking them.  Secondly, all possible precautionary 
measures must be taken in order to prevent, or at least to reduce, harm to civilians.  Finally, 
care must be taken to avoid an attack which might be expected to lead to harm to civilians.  
In addition, care must be taken to avoid placing military targets in or near populated areas. 
Id.  art. 57–58. 
 130.  It is prohibited to attack an unprotected location. First Protocol, supra note 55, 
art. 59. It is prohibited to attack hospitals and other medical facilities. Fourth Geneva 
Convention, supra note 53, art. 18; First Protocol, supra note 55, art. 12. It is prohibited 
to attack targets that are vital for the continued existence of the civilian population. First 
Protocol, supra note 55, art. 54. 
 131.  Yoo, supra note 108, at 139. 
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D. Should Terrorists be Recognized as Civilian                                  
Participants in Warfare? 
The principle of distinction creates, as noted above, two dichotomous 
categories in international law: civilians and combatants.  As a rule, it is 
prohibited to attack the civilian population and civilian targets, and therefore, 
they are not a legitimate target for attack.  However, there is a limited 
exception to the prohibition against harming civilians, which is set out in 
Article 51(3) of the First Protocol: 
Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this Section, unless and for such 
time as they take a direct part in hostilities. 
In other words, in general terms, the civilian population as a rule, and 
individual civilians in particular enjoy protection from military operations.  
However, in certain situations civilians can be a legitimate military target 
when, and for the duration of time during which, they take a direct part in 
hostilities.132 Note that a civilian participating in hostilities does not cease 
to be a “civilian”, but does become exposed to injury, as a result of 
participating in the fighting.133 In other words, civilians can be a target for 
military attack only at the time in which they take part in hostile activities.  
This can, in fact, be seen as harming the two category approach and as 
adding a kind of additional sub-category, which blurs the distinction between 
civilians and combatants. 
Professor Schmitt134 argues that this Article should be interpreted 
broadly in order to preserve the protection of the civilian population, for 
two main reasons.  First, a narrow interpretation of the protections that 
apply to the civilian population are also valid for civilians participating in 
hostilities, which might cause combatants not to respect the rules of 
international law because they might wish to defend themselves and harm 
the civilians that put them in danger.  Second, international law must 
provide an incentive to the civilian population, where possible, to distance 
itself from the conflict and not take part in it.  That has the effect of  
 
 132.  Bradley, supra note 70, at 399. 
 133.  Dormann, Legal Situation, supra note 98, at 46. 
 134.  See Michael N. Schmitt, “Direct Participation in Hostilities” and the 21st Century 
Armed Conflict, CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND HUMANITARIAN PROTECTION: IN HONOUR OF 
DIETER FLECK, 520, 529 (Horst Fischer et al. eds. 2004) (Ger.). 
GROSS (DO NOT DELETE) 10/7/2016  1:42 PM 
 
226 
improving the distinction between armed forces and civilians, thereby 
reinforcing the protection of the civilian population as a whole.135 
However, the official Red Cross interpretation narrows the application 
of the Article.  From the interpretation of the term “hostilities,” it would 
appear that it includes preparations for warfare and return from combat.136  
However, the interpretation of the term “direct part”137 states that only 
during direct involvement do civilians lose their immunity from harm and 
become a legitimate target.  The implication is that once a civilian stops 
taking a direct part in hostilities, he is entitled to the protections that apply 
to civilians and he is no longer a legitimate target of attack. 138  This 
interpretation gives rise to the question of the “revolving door”: Can a person 
be a civilian in daytime, and a combatant at night?139 
In the context of terrorists, this question becomes even more relevant.  
The Red Cross’ interpretation might justify itself in the context of “momentary 
combatants”—civilians who participate in fighting for a defined and limited 
period of time.  On the other hand, terrorists who devote their lives to terrorist 
activities are not “momentary combatants.”  Therefore, they are not civilians 
participating in hostilities temporarily and for a particular period of time; 
rather, they are illegal combatants who operate continuously and regularly. 
V.  THE TARGETED KILLINGS CASE AS A CASE STUDY 
The Targeted Killings Case140 dealt with the legality of the targeted 
killings policy (“preventative damage”)141 and, inter alia, discussed the 
status of illegal combatants.  The concrete issue that the judgment dealt 
with was whether, by executing a policy of “preventative damage” against 
terrorists, in which civilians are sometimes injured as well, the State of 
Israel was acting unlawfully.  This case is an example of the Supreme Court’s 
attempts to deal with the lack of regulation of the status of terrorists in 
international law.  This section will set out, briefly, the main facts that 
constituted the background to the judgment, and the pleadings by the 
parties.  Further, it will review the judgment of Barak CJ and his approach 
to the status of terrorists in international law.  Finally, this section will  
 
 135.  See id. at 509. 
 136.  Commentary on the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions, ¶ 1943 
(Int’l Committee of the Red Cross, June 8, 1977). 
 137.  The meaning of this term is acts of war which might, by their nature, cause very 
real damage to the persons or equipment of the enemy’s combat forces.  See id. ¶ 1944. 
 138.  See id. 
 139.  Schmitt, supra note 134, at 510. 
 140.  See HCJ 769/02, Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. Government of 
Israel, (1) PD 507 (2006) (Isr.) [hereinafter Targeted Killings Case]. 
 141.  Id. 
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critique the ruling of the Supreme Court and the implications thereof on 
the distinction between civilians and combatants. 
A.  Factual Background 
The petition was submitted against “the official targeted killing policy 
of the State of Israel,”142 during and after the Second Intifada.  This policy 
constitutes part of the State of Israel’s war against terrorism, and pursuant 
to it, the security forces harm terrorist operatives who are involved in the 
“planning, dispatch or perpetration of terrorist attacks against Israel.”143  
In the course of the targeted killings that have taken place over the years, 
a number of civilians who were near to the target have also been killed.144 
The petitioners claimed that this policy was illegal under Israeli criminal 
law and under the rules of international law.145 One of the central arguments 
raised by the petitioners was that the international laws of war contained 
only two categories, combatants and civilians, and that there is no third 
category of “illegal combatants.”  According to the petitioners, since a 
civilian participating in hostilities does not lose his status as a civilian,146 
operatives in terrorist organizations must be deemed to be civilians.147  In 
addition, the petitioners claim that the targeted killings policy was being 
implemented in contravention of the provisions of Article 51(3) of the 
Protocol,148 since they attack terrorists even when they are not taking a 
direct part in hostilities.149 
The State, on the other hand, claimed that even if terrorists truly did need 
to be deemed to be civilians, the targeted attacks policy was in compliance 
with the conditions of Article 51(3).  It argued that this section should be 
broadly interpreted, to avoid the absurd result that terrorists may only be 
 
 142.  File No. 769/02 HCJ, Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. Government 
of Israel, ¶ 1–3 (Dec. 11, 2005), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.) 
[hereinafter Petition]. 
 143.  Targeted Killings Case, supra note 140, ¶ 2. 
 144.  See id. 
 145.  Petition, supra note 142, at 4, 5. 
 146.  As discussed in the previous Chapter, a civilian participating in hostilities can 
only be attacked during the time in which he takes a direct part in the hostilities, and it is 
not possible to harm him at other times (as distinct from a combatant). 
 147.  Targeted Killings Case, supra note 140, ¶ 5. 
 148.  “Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this Section, unless and for 
such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.”  First Protocol, supra note 55, art. 51(3). 
 149.  See Targeted Killings Case, supra note 140, ¶ 6. 
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injured when they in fact commit a terrorist attack and not during the 
planning of or returning from performance of the operation.150 
In his Judgment, Barak CJ discussed the question of the status of terrorists 
in international law and the question of whether they must be deemed to 
be civilians or combatants.151  He ruled that terrorist organizations and their 
operatives must not be deemed to be combatants, since they do not make 
themselves subject to the international laws of war and do not wear 
prominent identifying symbols.152  In his view, terrorists are illegal 
combatants; therefore, are not entitled to the status of prisoners of war 
and can be judged on their actions.153 
However, according to Barak CJ, since a civilian is defined as anyone 
who is not a combatant,154 terrorists are civilians.  According to the Chief 
Justice, the approach taken by international law is that illegal combatants 
must be deemed to be civilians because they are not combatants (since, as 
aforesaid, this category is defined by negation).  Therefore, they are not 
entitled to all of the protections granted to civilians and are not protected 
against attack, so long as they take part in the hostilities.155  In other words, 
an illegal combatant does not lose his status as a civilian, but when he 
perpetrates a terrorist act, he is no longer entitled to the protections 
afforded to civilians and he becomes open to harm just like a combatant.  
On the other hand, he is not entitled to the protections granted to combatants 
nor to the status of prisoner of war.  The Chief Justice based his argument 
on Article 51(3) of the First Protocol.156 
B.  Critical Analysis of the Judgment 
The interpretive process employed by the Chief Justice in this Judgment 
can be critiqued on three levels: the first critiques the suitability of the 
exception in Article 51(3) to terrorists; the second relates to the expansion 
of the category of civilians, and the risk of breaching international law 
which stems from that; and the third deals with the State of Israel’s ongoing 
need to confront the threat of terrorism and the concern that this expansion 
of the category of civilians is not the required solution in such cases. 
 
 150.  Id. ¶ 12.  As set out in the previous chapter, the State’s position in the Judgment 
accords with that of Prof. Schmitt. 
 151.  Id. ¶ 23. 
 152.  Id. ¶ 24. 
 153.  Id. ¶ 25. 
 154.  See First Protocol, supra note 55, art. 50. 
 155.  Targeted Killings Case, supra note 140, ¶ 26–31. 
 156.  Id. ¶ 30.  Although Israel is not a signatory to this Protocol, the Supreme Court 
has accepted the Red Cross’ position that this is a customary principle of international law 
and, therefore, it applies to states that are not a party to it as well. 
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First, the wording of Article 51(3) of the First Protocol shows that it 
was aimed at dealing with a situation in which a civilian takes an active 
part in warfare, for a particular period of time.  Terrorists, on the other 
hand, are not civilians taking part in warfare for a particular period of 
time; rather, they are operatives in warfare for the duration of their lives.  
Therefore, the question that arises is whether the Article is suitable to this 
situation, in which the participation in warfare is not temporary.  In my 
opinion, the Article was not intended to protect a civilian who becomes a 
full-time combatant, and therefore, there is no room for inclusion of 
terrorists who devote their lives to terrorism in the Article.157 
Second, Barak CJ expands the category of civilians too far, thereby 
exposing Israel to claims of breach of international law.  The expansion of 
the category of civilians might lead to civilians who are not illegal combatants 
being suspected of being such, which exposes them to harm.  In addition, the 
Article allows harm to be made to terrorists only when they are actually 
perpetrating acts of terrorism and not at the rest of the time.  The significance 
of this is that it will not be possible to harm terrorists while they are planning 
terrorist attacks or when going to or from terrorist activities.158  A criticism 
that was leveled at the Judgment argued that its disregard of the requirement 
of taking a “direct part” in an operation weakens the protection that 
humanitarian law grants to civilians.159  Many commentators of international 
law give the term “direct part in the hostilities”  that appears in Article 
51(3) a narrow interpretation, which might view harm to terrorists at times 
between terrorist operations as being illegal harm.160 
Third, over time, this expansion of the category of civilians might not 
be sufficient in the ongoing legal handling of terrorist organizations.161 If 
terrorists fall within the category of civilians, then they must not be 
harmed and they certainly must not be harmed intentionally.  When a state 
is in an ongoing conflict with a terrorist organization, it might be presumed 
that it would seek to harm terrorists not only when they are in fact  
committing hostile acts, but also during the planning stages, during the 
dispatch stages, and during the intervening time.  Therefore, as could be 
 
 157.  For a more comprehensive discussion, see Part IV. 
 158.  Bradley, supra note 70, at 402. 
 159.  Kristen E. Eichensehr, On Target? The Israeli Supreme Court and the Expansion 
of Target Killings, 116 YALE L.J. 1873 passim (2008). 
 160.  Bradley, supra note 70, at 406. 
 161.  See id. 
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seen during the United States’ war in Afghanistan,162 countries that are in 
an ongoing conflict with a terrorist organization might deviate from the 
two-category approach by harming operatives in terrorist organizations 
under conditions that do not accord with the provisions of Article 51(3) 
of the First Protocol. 
In conclusion, this case is a test case that illustrates the difficulties in 
including terrorists in the category of civilians participating in hostilities.  
International law recognizes the importance of protecting civilians during 
the course of hostilities.  Clearly, the basic categorization that distinguishes 
between combatants and civilians is intended to protect the civilian 
population during wartime and to reduce the harm to it as far as possible.  
Should this broad protection be afforded to operatives of terrorist organizations 
seeking to harm the civilian population who do not view themselves as 
being subject to the rules of international law?  The answer to this, in my 
opinion, is negative.  Therefore, terrorists must not be viewed as civilians 
or even as civilians participating in hostilities. 
VI.  RECOGNITION OF A THIRD CATEGORY 
In Part IV, we examined the status of terrorists in light of the two 
category approach.  We noted that terrorists are not included under the 
category of combatants, nor even under the sub-category of freedom fighters.  
Therefore, they are not entitled to the protections granted to such category 
or recognition of the status of prisoners of war.163  As a result, we have 
reached the conclusion that if they cannot be deemed to be combatants, 
then a fortiori they cannot be deemed to be civilians, and they cannot be 
granted the broad protections that apply to this category.164 
In Part V, we set out how this lack of regulation is expressed in the 
judgments of the Supreme Court of Israel, and we examined the implications 
of “stretching” the category of civilians on the protections afforded to the 
civilian population.  Specifically, this article examined whether Article 
51(3) of the First Protocol, which deals with civilians who take an active 
part in hostilities, might be suitable to cover terrorists, as argued in the 
Judgment.  The conclusion arising from the critique of the Judgment is 
that Article 51(3) of the First Protocol does not provide the appropriate 
response with respect to the way in which a state might handle terrorist 
organizations and their operatives, and reinforces the argument that there 
is, at present, no appropriate regulation of the question of terrorism in 
 
 162.  A discussion of the United States approach to the question of illegal combatants 
is found in Part VI.  See infra at 234–37. 
 163.  Third Geneva Convention, supra note 52, art. 4. 
 164.  First Protocol, supra note 55, art. 51(4). 
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international law.  The fact that it is only possible to justify harm to 
terrorists under Article 51(3) shows that international law contains no 
response to the current situation. 
This section will discuss the characteristics of a third category, the rights 
and obligations that it would grant to those who fall within it.  First, it will 
examine how it provides a response to the problems flowing from the two-
category approach with respect to terrorist organizations.  Second, this 
section will also set out the approach taken by the Red Cross, which is 
responsible for the interpretation of international humanitarian law, with 
respect to recognition of the third category and to states’ confrontations 
with the threat of international terrorism.  Finally, this section will examine 
the developments in three countries—the United States, Great Britain and 
Israel—which have, in their national legal systems, created a third category 
of “illegal combatants.” 
A.  Definition of the Third Category 
It is clear that none of the existing categories of humanitarian law provides 
a response to how a democratic state should handle international terrorism.  
The existing categories, in the current situation, harm the distinction between 
civilians and combatants and endanger the civilian population on both 
sides of an armed conflict.  In addition, terrorists who do not comply with 
the rules of international law and who do not operate in accordance with 
the laws of war end up benefiting from this.  Therefore, there would appear 
to be no choice but to adapt international law to the current reality and to 
add a third category of illegal combatants to the laws of war. 
According to Professor Bradley, despite the fact that the two-category 
approach might appear to be the approach that affords the greatest protection 
of civilian freedoms, it is unclear whether this is the case with respect to 
an armed conflict between a state and a terrorist organization.165  If the 
terror organization and its operatives are included in the category of 
civilians, then it is reasonable to presume that this category should also be 
“stretched” in order to adapt to the security requirements of the state.  The 
final outcome might be a decrease in the protection of civilians who do 
not take an active part in hostilities.  Although the three category approach 
is less anchored in international treaties than the two category approach, 
 
 165.  Bradley, supra note 70, at 397. 
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it is more suited to a situation in which states need to deal with terrorist 
organizations.166 
Despite the fact that the term “illegal combatant”167 does not appear in 
the Geneva Conventions, it has been frequently used in legal writing,  
military guides and judgments.  The use of this term is not uniform, and it 
is hard to determine the boundaries of the category; however, we can see 
that it relates to persons who take part in hostilities despite not being 
entitled to do so.168  An example of this could be seen in World War II, 
where international law permitted armies to use a heavy hand against 
illegal combatants and even kill them after taking them captive.  On the 
other hand, legal combatants, who distinguished themselves from the 
civilian population, were entitled to protection as prisoners of war when 
in captivity.  This distinction was a significant incentive for combatants 
to operate in accordance with the laws of war and to distinguish themselves 
from the civilian population.169 
B.  The Position of the Red Cross 
When we think of the Red Cross, we tend to think of its function as 
administering aid to civilians harmed in violent conflicts.  However, a 
lesser-known and significant role of the Red Cross is its function as the 
gatekeeper of international humanitarian law. The Red Cross was 
involved in the drafting of the Geneva Conventions and was responsible 
for wording the drafts of the Conventions that form the basis for the 
Conventions that were ultimately passed.170  Therefore, the position taken 
by the Red Cross with respect to illegal combatants is significant, both in 
examining why no definition of this category has yet been accepted into 
international law and in understanding whether there might be a chance 
of soon seeing a change in the position taken by international law with 
respect to terrorism and the development of a third category. 
According to the position taken by the Red Cross, the Geneva Conventions 
are the cornerstone of the protection and preservation of human dignity 
during armed conflicts.171  The Conventions assisted in preventing 
 
 166.  Bradley, supra note 70, at 411. 
 167.  “Illegal combatant” may be interchangeable with “unlawful combatant” or 
“unprivileged combatant/belligerent.” 
 168.  Dormann, Legal Situation, supra note 98, at 46. 
 169.  Jason Callen, Unlawful Combatants and the Geneva Convention, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 
1025, 1026 (2003). 
 170.  Anna Segal, Why and How the International Committee of the Red Cross Supported 
the Establishment of the International Criminal Court, 9 HAMISHPAT 85, 86–87 (2004). 
 171.  Basic rules of the Geneva Convention and their Additional Protocols, ICRC (1988), 
http://www.geneva-academy.ch/RULAC/pdf/ICRC-Basic-Rules-in-the-1949-Geneva-
Conventions-and-1977-Additional-Protocols.pdf. 
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and limiting human suffering in wars in the past, and they have remained 
relevant to modern military conflicts.  Although some of the rules might 
require reform, the core of the Geneva Conventions is no less relevant 
today than it was sixty years ago.172  The Red Cross is aware that during 
the decades following adoption of the Geneva Conventions and the other 
Protocols, armed conflicts have arisen in many places around the world, 
which breached humanitarian international law.  However, the common 
conception is that these breaches do not stem from the lack of compatibility 
of the Conventions and Protocols to wars that are currently taking place, 
but are a result of lack of enforcement, an unwillingness to obey the rules, 
and lack of awareness.173 
International humanitarian law permits persons belonging to the armed 
forces of a state which is a party to an international armed conflict, as well 
as militias that are related to the dispute and that comply with the requisite 
conditions,174 to participate directly in the hostilities.  These combatants 
are considered “legal combatants,”175 and the implications of this are that 
they cannot be prosecuted for any hostile actions that they perpetrate during 
the course of fighting, so long as they act in accordance with the international 
laws of war.176  In addition, if taken captive, the combatants are entitled to the 
status of prisoners of war.177  As distinct from legal combatants, civilians 
who choose to engage in hostile activities are considered “illegal combatants” 
and are liable to being prosecuted under the local law of the arresting 
country for such activities.  The Red Cross recognizes the fact that the 
humanitarian law conventions do not contain the term “illegal combatant” 
expressly.  It should be noted that the status of prisoners of war is not 
granted to persons who do not lawfully take part in warfare.178 
With respect to terrorism, the Red Cross argues that one of the primary 
achievements of the First Protocol relates to the limitations that it imposes 
 
 172.  Knut Dormann, The Geneva Conventions Today, ICRC (July 9, 2009), http:// 
www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/statement/geneva-conventions-statement-090709.htm 
[hereinafter Doermann, ICRC]. 
 173.  Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Study on customary international humanitarian law: A 
contribution to the understanding and respect for the rule of law in armed conflict, 87 
(857) INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 3, 4 (2005). 
 174.  Supra Part IV. 
 175.  They may also be called “lawful or privileged combatants.” 
 176.  Dormann, Legal Situation, supra note 98, at 45. 
 177.  Id. 
 178.  The relevance of IHL in the context of terrorism, ICRC (Jan. 1, 2011), http://www. 
icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/faq/terrorism-ihl-210705.htm [hereinafter Relevance, ICRC]. 
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on combat methods and measures, with the aim of protecting civilians.179  
The Protocol unequivocally prohibits terrorist acts, attacks on civilians 
and civilian targets,180 and acts of violence or threats that aim to sow panic 
among the civilian population.  Persons suspected of acts of this kind can 
be prosecuted.  The First Protocol only provides protection for organizations 
and individuals who operate on behalf of a state or of “some other subject” 
in international law.  Therefore, terrorist organizations operating on behalf 
of themselves and without connection to any other entity are not entitled 
to the status of prisoners of war.181 
A development of the Red Cross’ policy can be seen in the “Interpretive 
Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under 
International Humanitarian Law.”182  The principal recommendations of 
the paper relate to civilians participating in hostilities in national conflicts: 
For the purposes of the principle of distinction in non-international armed conflict, all 
persons who are not members of State armed forces or organized armed groups 
of a party to the conflict are civilians and, therefore, entitled to protection against 
direct attack unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities. In 
non-international armed conflict, organized armed groups constitute the armed 
forces of a non-State party to the conflict and consist only of individuals whose 
continuous function it is to take a direct part in hostilities (“continuous combat 
function”).183 
This recommendation actually distinguishes civilians participating in 
hostilities temporarily from civilians who join combat organizations and 
operate as combatants for such organizations.  The significance is recognition 
of the status of a “continuous combat function,” which is similar to the 
status of a legal combatant.  The persons covered by this category are 
members of organized armed groups which do not belong to a state.  The 
implications of this status is that a person who falls within it loses the 
protection granted to civilians against harm, and therefore becomes a 
legitimate target of military attack.  However, the status is different from 
that of a combatant in that a person who falls into the category of a 
“continuous combat function” is not entitled to the status of a prisoner of 
 
 179.  We may note that Israel objected to joining the First Protocol, one of its arguments 
being that it encourages guerilla organizations to employ terrorist fighting tactics. See Ruth 
Lapidot, Yuval Shany & Ido Rosenweig, ISRAEL AND THE TWO ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS TO 
THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS (Daphna Schweppe ed. (2011) (Isr.). 
 180.  First Protocol, supra note 55, art. 51(2). 
 181.  Relevance, ICRC, supra note 178. 
 182.  ICRC, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities 
under International Humanitarian Law (May 2009) [hereinafter ICRC, Guidance]. This 
paper focused on three main issues: Who is contained within the category of civilians, what 
is direct participation in hostilities and what is the significance of removal of the protections 
granted to the civilian population from civilians who participate in hostilities. 
 183.  Id. at 16. 
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war.184  In addition, contrary to civilians who lose their protection against 
attack only for the period of time in which they perpetrate hostile acts, those 
who perform a “continuous combat function” are not protected against attack, 
so long as they continue in their position.185 
In contrast, with respect to international armed disputes, the Red Cross’ 
conclusion in this Guidance is that persons who take an active part in the 
hostilities but who are not part of the regular army of one of the parties to the 
conflict are civilians under the Hague Regulations, the Geneva Conventions 
and the First Protocol.186  The Targeted Killings case is an example of a 
national incident that reflects this position, as it held that under the rules 
of humanitarian law that regulate international armed conflicts, terrorists 
must be classified as civilians who take part in hostilities.187  Additionally, 
in a conference that took place in 2009, the Red Cross declared that the 
organization objected to the development of a third category of “illegal 
combatants” and that it finds it hard to understand the deficiency in 
international humanitarian law.188 
One of the explanations given by the Red Cross for classifying terrorists 
as civilians is that if they are classified differently, this could lead to harm 
to the dichotomy between civilians and combatants.189  I argue that this 
reasoning has no foothold in reality.  Terrorists, by their very nature, harm 
this dichotomous distinction, since they act from within population centers 
with the purpose of harming their enemy’s civilians.  The result of this 
position by the Red Cross might in fact be protection of terrorists, instead 
of the protection of innocent civilians.  The clear bottom line is that despite 
the fact that there has been some progress in the laws of war regarding 
national conflicts, the Red Cross insists that the laws that exist regarding 
international conflicts are sufficient.  It is unclear why it is the Red Cross, 
 
 184.  EVEN CHEN, supra note 11, at 337. 
 185.  ICRC, Guidance, supra note 182, at 17. 
 186.  Id. at 23. 
 187.  Targeted Killings Case, supra note 140, para. 25. 
 188.  Dormann, ICRC, supra note 172:  
With these avenues available to States, it is not clear to the ICRC what additional 
measures should or can be applied to so-called “unlawful” combatants without 
running the risk of seriously violating basic standards of humanity. In other 
words, what is lacking? Obviously, we do not subscribe to the view that 
standards prohibiting torture and other forms of ill-treatment should be revisited. 
We also do not believe that judicial guarantees should be relaxed as fair trial is 
a fundamental safeguard of international law. 
Id. 
 189.  ICRC, Guidance, supra note 182, at 23–24. 
GROSS (DO NOT DELETE) 10/7/2016  1:42 PM 
 
236 
which is supposed to be the “gatekeeper” of humanitarian law, is objecting 
to the development of new laws that would adapt the laws of war to 
modern warfare against terrorist organizations. 
C.  Actual State Recognition of the Third Category 
Although the term “illegal combatants” does not appear in the Geneva 
Conventions, it is expressed in the policies of states with respect to their 
own internal laws.  More than sixty years ago, during the Second World 
War, the Supreme Court of the United States recognized the distinction 
between legal combatants and illegal combatants: 
By universal agreement and practice, the law of war draws a distinction between 
the armed forces and the peaceful populations of belligerent nations, and also 
between those who are lawful and unlawful combatants. Lawful combatants are 
subject to capture and detention as prisoners of war by opposing military forces. 
Unlawful combatants are likewise subject to capture and detention, but, in 
addition, they are subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals for acts 
which render their belligerency unlawful.190 
However, many only heard the term in 2001, when the Bush Administration 
decided to classify Taliban and Al-Qaida fighters as illegal combatants.191  
The significance is that they can be harmed and arrested, similar to combatants, 
but they are not entitled to the status of prisoners of war.  In this way, the 
United States recognized a third category alongside the two existing 
categories of combatants and civilians.192 
In Great Britain, recognition of the third category stemmed from the 
refusal to view guerilla fighters as legal combatants.  In contrast to the 
United States (and Israel, as will be shown below), Britain recognized the 
third category in the British Army Field Manual, but not in a statute.193  
Additionally, the British Court has held that in the event that combatants 
(whether guerilla fighters or combatants belonging to a regular army) do 
not distinguish themselves from the civilian population, they are not 
entitled to the status of prisoners of war.194 
 
 190.  Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1942). 
 191.  Callen, supra note 169, at 1025. 
 192.  Bradley, supra note 70, at 399. 
 193.  U.K. WAR OFFICE, MANUAL OF MILITARY LAW, PART I, THE LAW OF WAR ON 
LAND 96 (1956).  Note that in the United States, in addition to the provision in the statute, 
the third category is also recognized in the US military law handbook: See JUDGE 
ADVOCATE GEN.’S SCH., OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 6 (Jeanne M. Meyer & Brian J. 
Bill eds., 2002), www.supremelaw.org/authors/jag/Operational.Law.Handbook.doc. 
 194.  Mohamed Ali v. Pub. Prosecutor [1969] 1 AC 430 (PC) (appeal taken from Malay.), 
[1968] 3 All E.R. 488 (UK). 
GROSS (DO NOT DELETE) 10/7/2016  1:42 PM 
[VOL. 17:  199, 2016]  The Third Player-Illegal Combatant 
  SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 
 237 
Israel has recognized the existence of the third category as well.  In 
2002, the Imprisonment of Illegal Combatants Law was enacted,195 the 
purpose of which was to regulate the imprisonment of “illegal combatants 
who are not entitled to the status of prisoners of war, in such a way as to 
accord with the State of Israel’s obligations under the provisions of 
international humanitarian law.”196 An illegal combatant is defined in section 
2 of the Law as follows: 
A person who takes part in hostile activities against the State of Israel, either 
directly or indirectly, or who is part of a force that perpetrates hostile activities 
against the State of Israel, to whom the conditions that grant a prisoner-of-war 
status under international humanitarian law, as set out in Article 4 of the Third 
Geneva Convention of August 12, 1949 with respect to the treatment of prisoners 
of war, do not apply.197 
Pursuant to this section, a person who takes part in hostilities against the 
State and who does not fall within the paradigms in the various international 
conventions, falls within this definition and constitutes an illegal combatant.  
This Law can be viewed as partial recognition of the third category of 
illegal combatants in Israeli law, since it only relates to the question of 
imprisonment of them and does not relate to the possibility of harming 
them.  However, the Law provides explicitly that illegal combatants are 
not entitled to the status of prisoners of war. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
The current situation, and particularly the spread of international terrorism, 
requires a reconsideration of international laws.  These laws, which were 
drafted during a period when wars were characterized by states fighting 
other states, have not been adapted to modern warfare in which states are 
required to fight terrorist organizations.  Recognition of a third category 
would equip states with additional tools in their fight against terrorist  
organizations and their operatives, and would assist in preservation of the 
basic distinction between civilians and combatants. 
We have seen that international law has not yet adopted a universal, agreed 
upon definition of the term terrorism, which is not even included as one of 
the offenses that fall within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal 
Court.  It is possible that multiple acts of terrorism, causing harm to so many 
 
 195.  Incarceration of Unlawful Combatants Law, 5762-2002, KT 5741 p. 948 (Isr.). 
 196.  Id. at § 1. 
 197.  Id. at § 2. 
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states around the world, might affect the acceptance of a definition of 
terrorism and the inclusion thereof within the jurisdiction of the ICC, and 
would equip states with suitable tools in their fights against terrorism. 
To this lack of a definition of terrorism, we can add the two category 
approach, which provides that international law recognizes only two 
categories—combatants and civilians.  An examination of the compatibility 
of terrorists to this categorization shows that they cannot be ascribed to 
either of the existing categories (nor to any of the sub-categories of 
freedom fighters or civilians participating in hostilities).  An examination 
of the Targeted Killings Case shows that the attempt to tailor humanitarian 
law, as currently worded, to a situation of terrorism, might, at the end of 
the day, lead to harm to the basic distinction between combatants and 
civilians, and as a result, might miss the point of humanitarian law, which 
is to protect the civilian population during wartime. 
The increase in international terrorism, and the fact that it is a factor that 
threatens the routine lives of civilians in most countries around the world, 
justifies the adoption of a new legal concept with respect to the status of terrorists 
in international law – a concept which would recognize a third category of illegal 
combatants as an additional category in the laws of war which would be suited 
to the war against international terrorism.  As can be seen, states have started 
to recognize this category in their own national laws, in order to deal with the 
threats of terrorism.  The Red Cross should be attentive to the changes that are 
in fact taking place in the nature of wars, and should advance the adaptation of 
the laws of war to the currently existing situation.  That is, first and foremost, in 
order to preserve the dichotomous distinction between civilians and combatants, 
and as far as possible, to prevent harm to civilians and to humanitarian interests. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
